An important implication of the efficient markets hypothesis is that corporate managers cannot, on average, successfully predict future market returns. While managers may try to issue equity when they believe it is overvalued or to issue long-term debt when they believe that future longterm bond returns will be low, they cannot do so with any systematic success when capital markets are complete and efficient. However, a number of recent studies argue that such forward-looking timing efforts may in fact correctly anticipate future market returns and lead firms to a lower cost of capital through successful market timing (see, for example, Ritter (1991) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) , Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) , and Baker and Wurgler (2000)).
Although most of the existing studies examine the ability of managers to time equity issues, recent evidence suggests that managers also time the maturity of their debt issues. For instance, Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) document that, in the aggregate, managers are able to engage in successful forward-looking timing of fluctuations in the yield curve by judicious choice of the maturity structure of their firms' debt. Specifically, these authors find a negative correlation between future excess long-term bond returns and the ratio of long-term debt issues to total debt (the "long-term share"). They interpret this as evidence of successful forward-looking timing-that is, managers tend to issue more long-term debt relative to shortterm debt when they predict that future excess long-term bond returns will be relatively low.
This result is surprising since most purchasers of corporate debt are sophisticated investors (for example, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds) who are unlikely to make naïve investment decisions.
While it is provocative to think that corporate managers may be better able to predict interest rate movements than other market participants, we examine an alternative explanation for this result that is consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. Specifically, we argue that a structural shift in the time series of excess long-term bond returns can create the illusion of successful forward-looking timing.
To understand the effect that a structural break can have on a regression coefficient, consider a simple illustration. Suppose that Y and X are two random variables that both exhibit an exogenous structural break in their means, but innovations in the two series are otherwise independent. For example, suppose a trade barrier to the importation of bananas and textiles is suddenly lifted due to a newly ratified trade agreement (an exogenous shock). In response, one would expect the average price of bananas (Y) to decline and the average quantity of textiles consumed (X) to increase. Since the means of Y and X change at the same time, the two series can exhibit a significant (unconditional) correlation because Y tends to be above its sample mean during the period in which X is below its sample mean (before the trade agreement), and vice versa. Now suppose an econometrician draws a finite sample of Y and X from both the pre-and post-trade agreement periods but ignores the structural break. If she regresses Y on X, she may find a large t-statistic on the regression coefficient for X. One interpretation of this regression result might be that the quantity of textiles consumed affects the price of bananas, although there is no real causal link between them. In this spurious regression, X simply serves as a proxy for the omitted structural change (the lifting of the trade barrier) in Y.
The spurious regression induced by shifting means can also create problems in predictive regressions of the type we consider here. Continuing the bananas-textiles example, if an econometrician regresses Y on lagged values of X, she may find evidence that the quantity of textiles consumed predicts future prices of bananas because lagged X will also tend to be above (below) its sample mean during the period in which Y is below (above) its sample mean. Even though X does not predict Y throughout the sample, an in-sample ordinary least squares (OLS) regression could generate a spurious correlation due to the shift in means around the trade agreement. As we show in this paper, structural shifts in the data can generate the illusion of successful forward-looking managerial timing. 1 In the case of excess bond returns, we find evidence of a structural break in 1982 around a significant change in U.S. monetary and fiscal policy. 2 This structural shift in monetary and fiscal policy systematically increased the relative cost of long-term debt, creating an incentive for firms to issue more short-term debt relative to long-term debt after 1982. Since this phenomenon causes the ratio of long-term debt issues to total debt issues to be above (below) its sample mean during the period in which the relative cost of long-term debt is below (above) its sample mean, an in-sample negative correlation could arise between the long-term share and future excess long-term bond returns. That is, even if firms only react to (as opposed to accurately forecast) the increase in the relative cost of long-term debt by issuing more short-term debt, the structural shift in the excess long-term bond returns in the early 1980s could generate an in-sample regression coefficient that might give the false appearance of successful forward-looking timing.
This is an important issue because previous work examining the predictive power of the long-term share uses a misspecified regression model that does not incorporate the effects of the structural break in 1982. Thus, it is possible that the previously documented negative relation between the long-term share and future excess bond returns may be spurious since the long-term share may simply be proxying for the omitted structural break. Consistent with this explanation, we find that ignoring the structural shift in the predictive regressions can significantly affect inferences about the coefficient of the long-term share. Specifically, we find that if we condition on the structural shift, the correlation between the long-term share and future excess returns disappears. That is, we find no evidence of within-regime predictability.
Although our empirical analysis suggests that the predictive power of the long-term share may be spurious, it is possible that the correlation between the long-term share and the structural shift may reflect the fact that managers predicted the break. We directly examine this explanation and find little evidence supporting it. Even in anticipation of a very large change in excess bond returns, managers do not appear to have guessed correctly the future direction of excess long-term bond returns in the years around the break. 3 Thus, it seems that the correlation between the long-term share (the predictor) and the structural break is driven by managers' reaction to the break. That is, managers appear to have simply reacted to the structural break by issuing more short-term debt when excess bond returns were relatively high, causing the longterm share to be relatively low after the break. Overall, we find little evidence of either successful within-regime timing behavior or successful between-regime timing behavior.
In addition to our analysis of aggregate data, we also examine the successful market timing hypothesis using firm-level data from Compustat. Specifically, we examine the relation between the proportion of firms with a net increase in long-term debt and future excess aggregate bond returns. The results from this analysis indicate that the proportion of firms that are net long-term debt issuers is unrelated to future excess bond returns. First, we find that, in any particular year, about half of all firms that issue new debt are net long-term debt issuers while the other half are net short-term issuers, independent of whether excess bond returns are low or high in the future. Further, we find no evidence that managers who "successfully" time the direction of future excess bond returns in a given year can repeat their performance in the future. Overall, our evidence indicates that previous evidence of successful market timing is not robust to alternative tests.
In a recent critique of our work, Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) estimate whether predictive regressions of the type we consider here are affected by the small sample bias of Stambaugh (1999) . They argue that the bias of Stambaugh (1999) is not severe and conclude that regression-based evidence of predictability must therefore reflect true predictive power.
They also claim that the problem we identify in this paper is just another name for the bias of Stambaugh (1999) . We comment on this issue directly and show that this is just not the case.
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While Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) confirm that excess bond returns experience a structural shift in the early 1980s, they assume that there is no relation between the predictor variable and the structural shift. As we show in this paper, it is exactly this property of the data that drives the dynamic misspecification we consider here. Thus, while Baker, Taliaferro, and
Wurgler (2006) clearly show that the bias of Stambaugh (1999) is small in this case, they fail to uncover a very simple, but different, form of spurious regression.
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Our work is also directly related to a recent survey of corporate financial managers by Graham and Harvey (2001) . They present evidence that managers react to current bond market conditions (firms issue debt when "interest rates are particularly low" (Table 9 , p. 220)) and may also attempt to time the maturity of their debt issues in a forward-looking sense (firms issue short-term when waiting for long-term market interest rates to decline (Table 11, pp. 224-225) ).
Of course, there is an important difference between managers trying to lower their cost of capital, and managers successfully lowering their cost of capital through such timing efforts.
Thus, while managers may try to time the market, our results suggest that the average corporate manager cannot successfully predict fluctuations in the yield curve.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a description of our sample and replicates previous results. Section II examines the effect of structural breaks on predictive regressions. In Section III we explore the successful managerial timing hypothesis with firm-level tests using Compustat data. Section IV reports the results of several robustness tests. Section V concludes.
I. Sample

A. Sample Description
We use the same data as Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) We provide summary statistics for these variables in Table I . Our measures of excess government bond returns, the long-term share of new issues, and scaled long-term and short-term debt issues are all very similar to those reported in previous studies. Because our measure of excess corporate bond returns is calculated as the excess long-term bond return over Treasury bill rates rather than over commercial paper rates, our mean excess corporate bond return of 1.8% is higher than the 0.66% that Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) report. However, while our measure is slightly different, our in-sample regression results do not differ qualitatively.
{Insert Table I here}
B. In-sample Evidence of Managerial Timing
The underlying hypothesis of successful managerial market timing is that corporate managers strategically shift between long-term and short-term debt in prescient anticipation of future excess bond returns. That is, when managers expect future excess long-term bond returns to be low (i.e., when they expect long-term yields to rise relative to short-term yields), they 
If managers can time the maturity of their debt issues, we should expect the coefficients on the new long-term issues and the long-term share to be negative and the coefficient on the new shortterm issues to be positive. That is, according to the managerial timing hypothesis, we expect managers to issue more long-term debt when they expect future excess long-term returns to be low and to issue more short-term debt when they expect future excess long-term returns to be high.
In Table II suggest that the long-term share has predictive power for future excess long-term bond market returns. However, in the following section, we show that the presence of a structural break in the time series of excess bond returns can complicate interpretations of simple full-sample regressions using these data.
{Insert Table II here}
II. Predictive Regressions and Structural Breaks
A. The Regime Change in U.S. Interest Rates in the Early 1980s
There is a large and well-developed literature in both economics and finance that finds that interest rates exhibit regime switching or structural break behavior. 7 In this section, we test whether the excess long-term bond return series that we consider also exhibit structural breaks over our sample period. This is an important issue because, as Granger and Newbold (1974) show, nonstationarity can have a significant effect on the parameters of an OLS regression. As we discuss below, statistical tests that do not account for the effects of structural breaks may lead to a spurious rejection of the null of no predictability.
There are several reasons to suspect that excess long-term bond returns are likely to experience structural breaks. First, as we mention above, a well-established body of statistical evidence indicates that interest rates exhibit structural breaks and regime switching behavior.
Second, there are good economic reasons to expect that interest rates, term spreads, and excess bond returns exhibit structural breaks. For example, business cycle expansions and contractions, changes in monetary policy objectives, and inflation expectations all naturally exhibit regime switching behavior, which feeds into the observed levels and changes in interest rate series.
Perhaps the most frequently identified regime shift in the post-war U.S. is that of the "Volcker experiment" in the early 1980s, when the Federal Reserve began a zero inflation policy in order to control rising inflation. At that time, the new Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, pursued a restrictive monetary policy that significantly increased interest rates. 8 The results of the change in policy were dramatic. Inflation fell from over 13% in 1980 to 6.2% by 1982 and the U.S. economy experienced a severe contraction from July 1981 through November 1982.
deficits throughout the 1980s and early 1990s caused long-term rates to exceed short-term rates by a wider margin than they did throughout the pre-Volcker period.
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Given these basic economic patterns, it is possible that excess bond returns experience structural breaks as well. One obvious candidate for a structural break is the drastic change in U.S. monetary and fiscal policy during the early 1980s. Although a full treatment of the history, causes, and consequences of monetary and fiscal policy and their impact on U.S. interest rates is beyond the scope of this paper, considerable economic and statistical evidence suggests that both monetary and fiscal policy exhibit regime switching behavior with a large shock occurring in the early 1980s.
B. Structural Shifts in Excess Bond Returns
Given the evidence for structural breaks in the time series of U.S. interest rates that we discuss in the previous section, it is possible that the time series of excess bond returns that we consider in this paper also exhibits structural breaks. In this section, we test whether excess bond returns exhibit similar shifts over the sample period by employing standard change point tests for a structural break.
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In the case of a simple structural parameter break, consider a dynamic relation between X and y given by where r is the structural break point for 0 γ ≠ . That is, the parameter t β changes in time period r from β to β γ + . In this simple case, our measures of excess bond returns follow a white noise process with a constant term that (possibly) has a regime shift. 13 Following Chow (1960), we then construct an F-statistic based on a structural break that occurs at t=r, that is,
where SSR is the sum of squared residuals from the OLS regression over each sample or subsample period, r is the break date, and T is the number of periods in the sample. Intuitively, the F-statistic given in (3) measures whether the errors from estimating the relationship between X and y are smaller when the parameters are allowed to change at point r.
In our case, the break date (r) is unknown. Therefore, we follow Quandt (1960) and Davies (1977) in measuring the maximum statistic over all r as 0 ,..., max .
Andrews ( 
as opposed to the alternative hypothesis that there is a structural break, that is,
Excess bond return = .
This is a somewhat more conservative test than the one we present in Panel A because it allows for the long-term share in new debt issues to proxy (potentially) for any regime change in the mean.
Panel B of Table III shows that the QLR statistic, again, is maximized when a break is included at 1982 and, again, we reject the hypothesis that there is a constant average excess bond return for the series. That is, even conditional on the lagged long-term share of new issues, the data suggest that a model that does not include a structural break in 1982 may be misspecified.
The existence of a change point in excess bond returns in 1982 is economically intuitive.
This period witnessed a major change in monetary policy and the beginning of a long period of large federal budget deficits. Further, this period is the most commonly identified structural break in the term structure, time series, and macroeconomics literatures. 15 Thus, the available evidence, both statistical and economic, points to the early 1980s as a structural break in our sample. Table IV examines the effects that the regime change had on both the maturity of debt issues and the excess returns on government and corporate bonds. The table shows that average annual short-term debt issuances increased, average annual long-term debt issuances decreased, and the share of long-term debt in all new debt issues decreased. Each of these differences in means is significant at the 1% confidence level (except for d Lt /D t-1 , which is significant at the 10% level). At the same time, the average (median) excess government bond returns went from -2.3% (-3.0%) during the pre-1982 period to 6.7% (7.8%) during the post-1982 period. Excess corporate bond returns behaved similarly, shifting from an average (median) of -1.8% (-2.9%) to 6.5% (6.6%) after 1982. Each of these differences is statistically significant. Figure 1 depicts how this regime change affected both the long-term share and excess bond returns.
{Insert Table IV The evidence in Table IV and Figure 1 indicates that the negative relation between excess bond returns and the long-term share may be driven by the fact that managers started to issue more short-term debt relative to long-term debt when the relative cost of long-term debt systematically increased in the early 1980s after the change in monetary and fiscal policy. As we explain above, this structural shift can generate a negative correlation between debt maturity and future excess long-term bond returns because the long-term share tends to be high (low) during the period in which the relative cost of long-term debt is low (high). Below we discuss the source of this statistical problem in more detail.
C. Shifting Means and Predictive Regressions
The evidence presented in Section II.B suggests that average excess bond returns experienced a structural shift in the early 1980s. Following our previous notation, this indicates that the data generating process for excess bond returns appears to be best characterized (at least for our sample) by
where I t is a dummy variable equal to one if 1982 t ≥ , zero otherwise.
However, suppose an econometrician ignores the nonstationary properties of y t and estimates a misspecified model that does not include the structural break. Such a dynamic misspecification could lead to a spurious regression problem if the predictor is correlated with the omitted dummy for the structural break. For example, if X and y both are affected by the structural break, then the predictive coefficient on X could be biased as Hassler (2003) and Elliott (2005) show. 16 Whether this misspecification has any effect on inferences regarding β , the predictive coefficient in (9), is ultimately an empirical question that we address in Section II.D.
A recent paper by Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) argues that the problem we identify is simply another name for the small sample bias identified by Stambaugh (1999) .
However, this is not the case. The dynamic misspecification that we identify arises from ignoring the nonstationary properties of y t . While Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) acknowledge that y experiences a structural break, their analysis falls short when they assume that the time series properties of x t are completely unaffected by the structural break. As we demonstrate in Table IV , the evidence does not support this strong assumption. In the case we consider, this amounts to assuming away the problem, and as a result, it is not surprising that they find little cause for concern in their simulations. While it may be true that the bias identified by Stambaugh (1999) is a minor concern in this case, it has nothing to do with the dynamic misspecification that we identify in this paper. In the following section we investigate whether the existence of the break has any real effect on the slope coefficient on the long-term share. We show that, indeed, the effect is quite large.
D. Effect of the Structural Break on the Predictive Regression
The previous discussion suggests that the evidence of predictability in Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) could be different if we correct for the misspecification problem in equations (1) and (2). To test this conjecture, we augment these specifications to include a dummy variable equal to one if the observation occurs on or after 1982, zero otherwise.
The new regression equations are therefore given by: cumulative three-year-ahead returns. Moreover, we find that the R 2 s from these regressions are higher than those presented in Table II . In fact, once we incorporate the structural break, the incremental R 2 s of the long-term share is less than one percentage point, which is consistent with the long-term share simply serving as a proxy for the shock. In short, the predictive content of the maturity structure of new debt issues vanishes after we control for the structural break in excess bond returns. This indicates that the long-term share has no within-regime predictability.
{Insert Table V here}
E. Is there Evidence of Successful Managerial Timing around the Structural Break?
It is important to note that the analysis in the previous subsection cannot rule out the possibility that managers predicted the break in 1982. That is, it is possible that the relationship between the long-term share and future excess bond returns is driven by the observations surrounding the structural shift. Although this would effectively reduce the evidence of predictability in Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) to just one event, it may still represent real evidence of successful timing because, as we show in Table IV , the structural break was a significant event.
17 However, it is also possible that the time-series properties of the long-term share are driven by managers' reaction to the break (rather than a prediction of the break). That is, in response to excess bond returns increasing after the structural break, managers may have simply reacted by issuing more short-term debt, causing the long-term share to be above its sample mean when excess bond returns were low (during the pre-break period) and below its sample mean when excess bond returns were high (during the post-break period).
Although both hypotheses predict a negative correlation between the predictor variable and the structural break dummy, we try to distinguish between these hypotheses by examining 
III. Tests Using Firm-Level Data
In the previous sections, we find little evidence that managers are successful at timing the maturity structure of their debt. However, all of our analysis above is conducted at the aggregate level. At the firm level, it is almost surely the case that in any given year some managers will increase while others will decrease the maturity of their debt issues. In this section we dig deeper into firm-level variation in firms' capital structure choices in anticipation of changes in future excess bond returns. Essentially, we test how many managers successfully time their maturity structure in any given year in the sense that their security issuance decision during the year correctly anticipates future bond returns.
To determine how many firms successfully time their maturity structure each year, we use Compustat data from 1976 to 2002 to construct the annual proportion of firms that are net issuers of long-term debt for each year.
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That is, for each year we determine whether each firm increased long-term debt by more or less than any change in short-term debt. Following
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003), we define new issues of long-term debt as the change in the level of long-term debt (Compustat annual data item 9) plus debt due in one year (Compustat annual data item 44) and we define new issues of short-term debt as notes payable (Compustat annual data item 206). We then construct the proportion of firms with a net increase in longterm debt as the number of net long-term debt issuers in a year divided by the total number of firms with data available for that year. One can think of this proportion as a variant of the longterm share measure in which each issuing firm gets equal weight. If more firms are shifting from short-term debt to long-term debt in a given year (the proportion of long-term issuers is rising), then long-term bonds should underperform short-term bonds in the future if, on average, managers are successful at market timing.
We perform the following analysis to test whether long-term bonds underperform after firms shift away from issuing short-term debt. For each year between 1976 and 2002, we determine whether excess bond returns in the following year were particularly low or high; accordingly, we assign each year to an above-median or below-median future excess bond return portfolio. Within each portfolio, we then compute the average proportion of firms that raised more long-term debt than short-term debt. If firms are correctly anticipating future excess bond returns, then more firms should be shifting into short-term bonds when future excess bond returns are above the median. Table VI presents the results of our analysis. As expected, there is a considerable spread in the mean future excess bond returns between the two groups. In the 13 below-median years, one-year-ahead excess corporate bond returns were -4.9% compared to excess returns of 12.9% in the 12 high return years. While a difference of roughly 18 percentage points between the returns of the two portfolios is economically large, there is surprisingly little difference in the proportion of firms shifting from long-term to short-term debt. For the full sample, about 51% of firms raised more long-term debt than short-term debt when returns were low in the next period compared to about 50% when returns were high in the next period. The same pattern holds true for both large and small firms (above or below the median market capitalization each year) and for high market-to-book and low market-to-book firms (above or below the median). In each case, there is no significant relationship between future excess bond returns and the proportion of firms that are net long-term debt issuers.
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{Insert Table VI here} Overall, the evidence in this section is inconsistent with firms generally having any abnormal ability to time the maturity structure of their debt. Such tests, of course, cannot determine whether the firms that guessed correctly were lucky or exhibited abnormal forecasting ability. To help distinguish between luck and ability, we also investigate whether there is any persistence in the performance of managers who appear to have correctly guessed the direction of future returns. In Table VII , we compute the proportion of firms that guessed the direction of future excess bond returns correctly, and then compute the proportion of those firms that guessed correctly (or incorrectly) the next time they changed their debt maturity. That is, we ask what proportion of firms consistently gets it right. As Table VII shows, conditional on correctly guessing the direction of future returns, 49.6% guess correctly the next time and 50.4% guess incorrectly the next time. Thus, there does not appear to be any persistence in performance among managers that happen to guess correctly in a given year. Even if some managers do exhibit the ability to lower their cost of capital through efforts to time future returns, it appears that an equal number may actually raise their cost of capital by guessing incorrectly.
In sum, the results of our tests do not support the hypothesis that the typical firm has any abnormal ability to successfully predict future movements in the yield curve. 
IV. Robustness
A. Changes in Maturity Structure versus Long-term Share in New Issues
Following the methodology in prior studies, we define the change in short-term debt at time t as the level of short-term debt at time t (because short-term debt has maturity of less than one year) and we measure the change in long-term debt at time t as the change in the level of long-term debt from time t-1 to time t, plus one-tenth the level of long-term debt at time t-1 (the assumption here is that one-tenth of the long-term debt matures each year). Although these definitions seem to be good proxies for the amounts of short-and long-term debt that firms issue to replace old debt and raise new money, they do not reflect changes in the maturity structure of firms' debt.
To understand this difference, consider the following example. Suppose that the amount of short-term debt at both time t and time t+1 is $500 million, and that the amount of long-term debt at time t and time t+1 is $200 and $400 million, respectively Although it is clear that the firms in this example are significantly increasing the average maturity of their debt (no change in short-term debt versus a change in long-term debt of $200 million), the definitions in Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) suggest that firms are actually decreasing the average maturity of their debt. Therefore, it is not clear that the long-term share is a good measure of the maturity structure of firms' debt.
Thus, to measure the changes in the aggregate maturity structure, we need a measure that captures only the changes in debt that move firms away from their previous maturity structure.
Our previous example suggests that the net changes in short-term and long-term debt (e.g., changes in levels) capture changes in maturity structure. Thus, we use these variables to investigate whether firms deviate from their previous debt maturity structure in anticipation of changes in future interest rates.
For our empirical analysis, we define the change in short-term (long-term) debt as the changes in the level of short-term (long-term) debt from time t-1 to time t, scaled by the level of short-term (long-term) debt at time t-1. We also create a variable that measures the differential in the growth rates between long-term debt and short-term debt (the change in long-term debt minus the change in short-term debt) to capture in one variable the strategic behavior of corporate managers.
In Table VIII we replicate the analysis in Table II To accommodate a stochastic process for the mean excess bond return, we estimate a two-state regime switching model following Hamilton (1989) , where the mean excess bond return belongs to either a high or low excess bond return state and the transition between states is stochastic. The ex post smoothed state probabilities (for example, the probability that the excess bond return is in the high return state) are computed following Kim (1994) .
To This result is also confirmed by Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) . In more complicated regime switching models (for example, allowing for GARCH specifications for the variance process, or allowing for more than two regimes), the results still point to the early 1980s as a significant change point with strong persistence. In alternative specifications, at the monthly frequency there is some evidence of high regime excess returns during the Oil Crisis of the early 1970s and the stagflation period of the mid-1970s. Also, there is evidence that some months in the latter part of the sample (post-1995) exhibit low excess bond return regime behavior. In all specifications, there is not enough persistence in these short-lived regime switches to substantively affect the annual averages. That is, allowing for the possibility of multiple breaks leaves our results qualitatively unchanged. Thus, the basic patterns in the data support a single structural break in the annual series of excess bond returns.
V. Conclusion
Can corporate managers take advantage of market inefficiencies in the timing of their security offerings? This is an important question in the behavioral corporate finance literature.
Dozens of papers in recent years examine whether managers can accurately time market movements in their equity and debt issuance decisions, and/or take advantage of market inefficiencies in timing their capital structure and payout decisions. Our evidence shows that, in the aggregate, managers are unable to successfully time securities issuance around fluctuations in the yield curve.
Our results question the meaning of managerial market timing. There is no clear consensus in the literature as to what managerial market timing means (see Barry, et al. (2005) for a discussion of different views of market timing). If "timing" means that managers use current and past information to successfully forecast future price changes (what we refer to as successful market timing), then our findings do not support theories of managerial market timing.
On the other hand, if managerial market timing is only meant to imply that managers try to predict future price changes, but may or may not fare any better than other market participants (what we refer to as unsuccessful market timing), then our results do support managerial market timing. Unfortunately, support for the unsuccessful managerial market timing theory is somewhat less satisfying since it essentially predicts that quantity should respond to price.
We show that the macroeconomic regime shift caused by changes in monetary and fiscal policy in the early 1980s affected both the maturities of new bond issues and the excess returns on long-term government and corporate bonds. A researcher failing to condition on the structural shift could easily infer, apparently incorrectly, that corporate managers are able to forecast movements in the yield curve better than other market participants, and to time their debt issues accordingly. Our results suggest that the maturity of new debt issues cannot predict excess bond returns and corporate managers cannot successfully time the maturity of their debt issues. More broadly, our paper highlights the importance of properly accounting for nonstationarities such as macroeconomic shifts in time-series analysis. As in Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005), we find that major shocks or regime changes can simultaneously affect many economic variables, thereby creating the illusion of predictability. 11 See Gale and Orszag (2003) for a recent survey of the large literature on the relationship between budget deficits and the crowding out effect on long-term bond yields.
12 In Section IV.B we investigate whether the series exhibits a unique structural break or more general Markov switching behavior. While we find evidence of only one break, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of multiple break points or regime switching behavior. 13 We also consider more complicated tests in which there are time-series dependencies of various orders; but our results do not vary qualitatively.
14 All of our results are qualitatively unchanged if we include new short-term issues of debt and new long-term issues of debt separately as conditioning variables, rather than the share of new long-term debt.
15 See the references cited above. 17 For example, between the four years prior to the event (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) and the four years afterward (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , average excess corporate bond returns went from -11% to 13.4%, a change of about 25 percentage points.
Table I Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for our annual data series for the sample period 1953-2001. Summary statistics are based on annual time-series variation for each series. Excess government bond returns are constructed as the returns on long-term government bonds less the returns on Treasury bills. Excess corporate bond returns are constructed as the difference between the Ibbotson long-term corporate bond portfolios with 20-year maturity and the returns on Treasury bills. The long-term share of new debt issues is constructed as new issues of long-term debt divided by total new issues of debt. Long-term debt includes industrial revenue bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgages. Total debt also includes commercial paper, bank loans not elsewhere classified, and other short-term loans and advances. All short-term debt is assumed to be new short-term issues. The change in long-term debt plus one-tenth of lagged long-term debt is assumed to be new long-term issues. We collect all data on debt issues from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. 
Table II The Predictive Power of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues
This table reports regression results for our annual data series for the sample period 1953-2002. Excess government bond returns are constructed as the returns on long-term government bonds less the returns on Treasury bills. Excess corporate bond returns are constructed as the difference between the Ibbotson longterm corporate bond portfolios with 20-year maturity and the returns on Treasury bills. The long-term share of new debt issues is constructed as new issues of long-term debt divided by total new issues of debt. Long-term debt includes industrial revenue bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgages. Total debt also includes commercial paper, bank loans not elsewhere classified, and other short-term loans and advances. All short-term debt is assumed to be new short-term issues. The change in long-term debt plus one-tenth of lagged long-term debt is assumed to be new long-term issues. We collect all data on debt issues from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. Each regression specification is of a form similar to: r GLt+1 -r GSt+1 = a + b´X t + e t+1 . . In these regressions we condition on the structural break by including in each regression a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the time period is 1982 or later, and zero otherwise. Excess government bond returns are constructed as the returns on long-term government bonds less the returns on Treasury bills. Excess corporate bond returns are constructed as the difference between the Ibbotson long-term corporate bond portfolios with 20-year maturity and the returns on Treasury bills. The long-term share of new debt issues is constructed as new issues of long-term debt divided by total new issues of debt. Long-term debt includes industrial revenue bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgages. Total debt also includes commercial paper, bank loans not elsewhere classified, and other short-term loans and advances. All short-term debt is assumed to be new short-term issues. The change in long-term debt plus one-tenth of lagged long-term debt is assumed to be new long-term issues. We collect all data on debt issues from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. Each regression specification is of a form similar to: r GLt+1 -r GSt+1 = a + b´X t + cI + e t+1 . This table presents average future (one-year ahead) excess bond returns and the average annual proportion of Compustat firms that issue more long-term debt than short-term debt during the period 1976 to 2002. Each year the proportion of firms with a net increase in long-term debt is determined by comparing new issues of long-term debt to new issues of short-term debt and counting the percentage of firms with a greater increase in long-term debt. New issues of long-term debt are computed as changes in long-term debt (Compustat annual data item 9) plus long-term debt due in one year (Compustat annual data item 44). New issues of short-term debt are computed as notes payable within one year (Compustat annual data item 206). Annual proportions are computed as the number of Compustat firms that issue more long-term debt than short-term debt relative to all firms issuing debt. The one-year-ahead excess corporate bond return is classified for each year over the period 1976-2002 as above or below the median. Large and small firm portfolios are determined by restricting the sample of Compustat firms to only those firms whose market value of equity is above or below the median for that year. High and low market-to-book portfolios are constructed by restricting the sample of Compustat firms to only those firms with a market-to-book ratio (market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets) that is above or below the median for that year. p-values are reported below differences and are based on two-tailed mean-comparison tests with unequal variances. This table presents the proportion of firms whose choice between long-term and short-term debt correctly (or incorrectly) forecasts future excess bond returns. Each year, we classify all firms as correctly forecasting returns if they issue net long-term debt the year before excess bond returns are below the sample average or if they issue net short-term debt the year before excess bond returns are above the sample average. Firms that choose between long-term and short-term debt in the opposite direction are classified as incorrectly forecasting returns. We also compute the proportion of firms that correctly forecast future excess bond returns conditional on whether they correctly forecast returns the next time they issue debt. Our sample consists of all Compustat firms with a net change in debt each year during the period 1976 to 2002. Firms with a net increase in long-term debt are determined by comparing new issues of long-term debt to new issues of short-term debt and counting the percentage of firms with a greater increase in long-term debt. New issues of long-term debt are computed as changes in long-term debt (Compustat annual data item 9) plus long-term debt due in one year (Compustat annual data item 44). New issues of short-term debt are computed as notes payable within one year (Compustat annual data item 206). This table reports regression results for our annual data series for the sample period 1953-2002 using measures of changes in aggregate debt maturity. Excess government bond returns are constructed as the returns on long-term government bonds less the returns on Treasury bills. Excess corporate bond returns are constructed as the difference between the Ibbotson long-term corporate bond portfolios with 20-year maturity and the returns on Treasury bills. The long-term share of new debt issues is constructed as new issues of long-term debt divided by total new issues of debt. Long-term debt includes industrial revenue bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgages. Total debt also includes commercial paper, bank loans not elsewhere classified, and other short-term loans and advances. All short-term debt is assumed to be new short-term issues. The change in long-term debt plus one-tenth of lagged long-term debt is assumed to be new long-term issues. We collect all data on debt issues from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. Each regression specification is of a form similar to: r GLt+1 -r GSt+1 = a + b´X t + e t+1 . 
